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ABSTRACT 
 
Financial crime is a large area of political and social enquiry and includes a variety of 
illicit conducts that need to be isolated and addressed as discrete offences. Financial 
operations, however, may cause harm even when they do not possess a criminal 
nature, as events relating to the 2008 bank crisis have shown. This paper is concerned 
with both typologies, namely with illicit and licit harmful behaviour adopted by 
financial actors. In the first section, the paper focuses on the measures proposed or 
adopted in response to the 2008 crisis in the UK. This is followed by the presentation 
 
 
2 
  
of a number of recent cases proving that, despite recent regulatory efforts, large 
loopholes are still present which allow forms of financial crime to thrive. 
 
KEYWORDS: Discrete crimes, Money laundering, Proposals, Types, Cases. 
 
RESUMEN 
 
Delitos financieros es una gran área de investigación política y social e incluyen una 
variedad de conductas ilícitas que deben ser aisladas y tratadas como delitos discretos. 
Las operaciones financieras, sin embargo, pueden causar daño aun cuando no poseen 
carácter penal, como han demostrado los acontecimientos relacionados con la crisis 
bancaria de 2008. Este artículo se refiere a dos tipologías; es decir, con 
comportamientos nocivos ilícitos y lícita adoptada por los actores financieros. En la 
primera sección, el trabajo se centra en las medidas propuestas o adoptado en 
respuesta a la crisis de 2008 en el Reino Unido. Esto es seguido por la presentación de 
una serie de casos recientes demuestra que, a pesar de los recientes esfuerzos 
regulatorios, grandes lagunas todavía presentes que permiten formas de delitos 
financieros para prosperar. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Delitos discretos, Lavado de dinero, Propuestas, Tipos, Casos. 
 
HOT MONEY 
 
Stricter regulations aiming to unearth hidden (furtive or hot) money are usually 
embedded in the assumption that the bulk of this money is drug-related, namely part 
of the proceeds of criminal organizations. In reality, amongst the various operations 
contributing to the international volume of hot money, consideration should be given 
to tax evasion, illegal exportation of capital by entrepreneurs operating in hidden 
economies, international bribes and movements of finances from developing countries 
benefiting from international aids. The last portion includes money which is not spent 
or invested locally, but returns to the developed countries as illegally exported capital. 
This money is often deposited in the very banks that acted as intermediaries for the 
aids given (Ruggiero, 2015; Money Laundering Bulletin, 2014). 
Regulations in this area, while attempting to hit on conventional criminal 
groups, appear to be inspired by the necessity to leave other actors untouched. In brief, 
regulations mainly address organised crime while ignoring white collar crime, and 
there is a danger that, were such regulations too strict, they would produce the 
unintended consequence of hampering the latter as well. We can therefore argue that, 
while organised criminals and white collar offenders, in this specific arena, commit the 
same violations and often use the same techniques, their treatment is differentiated. 
The following outline of the measures proposed and/or introduced in response to the 
2008 financial crisis sets the scene for an understanding of how this differentiated 
treatment is likely to take shape. 
 
PREVENTING FUTURE CRISES? 
 
As mentioned at the beginning, not all financial activities can be labelled as criminal, 
although they may be socially harmful. Responses to the crisis, one would assume, 
should be capable of tackling both criminal and non-criminal harmful activities carried 
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out in the financial sphere. Let us see, in the broad summary below, how the 
authorities formulated their responses. 
    
The basel committee 
 
The primary international forum for the co-ordination of financial regulation is 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, based at the Bank for International 
Settlements – the so-called central bankers’ bank (Martin, 2013). In Basel, regulatory 
weapons to mitigate financial hazard have been designed in the past, such as rules 
requiring banks to keep a specified quantity of cash or highly liquid securities in their 
portfolios. This requirement has the function of a tax, in the sense that it imposes a 
cost on banks that decide to act in an adventurous manner. It is like the tax some 
would like to impose on polluting industries. However, in the financial sphere all rules 
are extremely difficult to enforce, because they are normally non-binding rules. 
Moreover, some commentators would endorse the argument that all regulatory 
measures, particularly those making banking operations more costly, have a perverse 
effect. If banks are required to raise capital as a form of guarantee to avoid future 
crashes, the argument goes, the cost they incur will make the crush even worse. This 
will mean scarcity of liquidity, therefore a restriction in the ability of banks to give 
loans. And of course, loans and other forms of credit given to entrepreneurs are 
essential for the economic recovery. So, the paradox of regulatory measures in 
response to the crisis is that they exacerbate the crisis (ibid).  
In December 2009, the Basel Committee reiterated that banks had entered the 
crisis with too little capital and poor efficiency. Harmonising the capital reserves, 
monitoring standards of bank liquidity and establishing a ‘leverage ratio’1 were among 
the suggestions made. The issue of assessing and predicting risk in financial 
operations was also raised.  
The document released by the Basel Committee made some commentators 
observe that it is not enough to ‘tighten a screw here and put in a new nail there’: the 
entire ship of banking regulation needs a thorough overhaul (Hellwig, 2010). 
Moreover, the regulatory community was accused of sticking to a tradition of 
discussing among bureaucratic cognoscenti, without even trying to explain to the 
public at large the effects that the new measures were expected to produce.  
As for the proposed measures oriented toward prediction of risk, these were 
deemed ineffective, because risk cannot be reliably measured. 
    
Managers directive 
 
In July 2011, the European Parliament and the Council of Europe issued an 
‘Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive’. The Directive regulates EU 
managers who deal with hedge funds and private equity funds, it establishes general 
operating conditions and limits to leverage, while calling for transparency and stricter 
supervision. It also fixes a ceiling for remunerations and bonuses for bankers and 
brokers, while requiring the appointment of independent risk managers and 
                                                          
1 In finance, leverage is a general term for any technique to multiply gains. Most often this 
involves buying more of an asset by using borrowed funds. The belief is that the income from 
the asset will exceed the cost of borrowing. As the 2008 crisis demonstrates, this involves the 
risk that borrowing will be larger than the income from the asset, causing loss or even collapse. 
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evaluators. Although EU countries were expected to turn the provisions of the 
Directive into national legislation, as of April 2014, 16 member sates had failed to do 
so. Asset managers employed in the UK regard the Directive as an obstacle to 
competition and, in their opinion, will reduce the number of overseas agents operating 
in the EU. 
    
Regulatory bodies 
 
Discussions following the immediate aftermath of the crisis indicated that 
reform had to focus on the relationship between governments and independent 
regulatory bodies. Design faults in the administrative and regulatory machinery were 
detected. As a remedy, suggestions were put forward to set up committees formed of 
politicians and professional economists, with a view to exercising overall control over 
business conduct, on the one hand, and over systemic issues, on the other (Goodhart, 
2008). Regulation, however, does not affect shadow banking, which in fact ends up 
attracting an increasing number of traders who feel that the restraints prevents them 
from operating.  
 
Cross-border consequences 
 
Due to short-sightedness, the crisis was initially regarded as affecting 
individual countries, therefore, its cross-border consequences were almost totally 
neglected. Bailing out banks was perceived as a domestic issue and it remained 
unknown how the loss burden arising from transnational institutions might be 
handled. Only later were international changes invoked, through a ‘Memorandum of 
Understanding’ on cooperation for cross-border financial stability, prompting the joint 
action of supervisory authorities, central banks and finance ministries of the European 
Union countries (Praet and Nguyen, 2008). The Financial Stability Forum took the 
lead in the process, recommending stricter monitoring of liquidity and risk and the 
enhancement of transparency. However, such recommendations were accompanied by 
an underlying belief in the disciplinary role of markets, thus displaying an implicit 
scepticism towards the very measures suggested. Authorities were asked to 
investigate whether adding new requirements to adaptive market practices would be 
advisable or might end up being redundant. Market practices, in brief, were and are 
still deemed ‘adaptive’ and self-disciplined, irrespective of the damage caused. 
The type of transparency advocated was linked to the capacity of public 
authorities to gather information, assess liquidity and appraise performance. 
Transparency, therefore, did not entail stricter institutional control, but rather the 
possibility of quantifying losses and covering them with public funds. This appears to 
be the only acceptable state intervention tolerated by financial institutions. The 
network established by the Financial Stability Forum was therefore required to gather 
data around financial practices, ‘encourage mutual exchange of information that are 
necessary for the proper execution of the mandate of each institution’ (ibid: 371). The 
rescue operations made it clear what the mandate of governments had to be.  Due to 
the global dimension of the crisis, authorities in all the countries involved were asked 
to cooperate to resolve the crisis situation. The case of Greece shows how third 
countries were expected to contribute to the solution of the crisis. Greece had been 
helped by international authorities to forge its public accounts, and because the crush 
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affected all, the country was forced to bear the brunt of unprecedented austerity 
measures.  
Internationalisation of finance meant that all national bond markets were 
affected, and in countries such as Ireland and Spain domestic taxpayers found 
themselves footing the bill for bank recapitalisation that benefited foreign bond- 
holders. In sum, responses to the crisis, at least in Europe, took the form of austerity 
packages producing further increases in unemployment and growing public unrest 
(Calhoun and Derluguian, 2001; Turner, 2013). 
 
‘When, on 31 January 2011, Anglo-Irish Bank – which had been recapitalised to the 
tune of 25.3 billion euros by Irish taxpayers – repaid in full and on schedule a 750 
million euro bond to its investors, the distribution of risk under the new regime of 
sovereign credit support for banks was on stark display. The total cuts to welfare 
spending in that year’s Irish budget amounted to a little over the same amount’ 
(Martin, 2013: 238). 
 
In the past, it was acceptable that ordinary citizens helped bond-holders, 
because almost everybody, through pension and mutual funds, was a bond-holder. But 
with the growing polarisation of wealth, an elite has taken shape which detains large 
quantities of assets and then, when in trouble, expects to be bailed out by those who 
detain little.  
In brief, the need for, and the form of public intervention were and still are 
taken as an undisputable given. The principles enunciated by the Forum reaffirmed 
‘the primacy of private sector solutions’, but ‘when a strictly private-sector solution 
cannot be found, public funds have to be mobilised’ (Praet and Nguyen, 2008: 372). 
Authorities, by intervening, do not have to rescue those harmed by the financial crisis, 
but simply attempt to strengthen market players’ confidence. Finally, it was felt that 
public intervention could not be restrained through ex-ante rules, but had to remain 
‘open’ to contingent necessities emerging by future crises. With this, state intervention 
in support of financial markets was not only definitively ratified, but all qualitative 
and quantitative limits to that intervention were lifted. Rescue operations carried out 
with public resources, on the other hand, were encouraged by the awareness that the 
financial crisis was noticeably more acute in countries where the supervision of banks 
was carried out by an independent agency rather than by the central bank.  
    
Regulating Europe 
  
‘A crisis is a terrible thing to waste’, goes the motto, meaning of course that 
errors committed in the past can bring to more efficient arrangements. Not so in the 
UK, where ‘light touch’ regulation is still preferred, and where reform finds an 
impervious terrain, showing how the conflicting interests of EU member states are 
significant (Begg, 2009). Regulating the activities of financial intermediaries, for 
example, is problematic for the EU because of the clashes between national 
sensitivities. Disagreements are hard to avoid as to how best reach a coherent 
approach to cross-border risks and burden-sharing. ‘The UK has sought to avoid a 
dominant role for EU bodies in supervision which could pose a competitive threat to 
the City of London’ (ibid: 1121). The new European System of Financial Supervisors 
outflanks the problem by granting an enhanced role to national supervisors. No 
changes in this specific area can therefore be recorded. 
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The situation is compounded by the pace and creativity of financial innovation, 
which forces regulation to chase developments rather than prevent, let alone cause 
them. This notwithstanding, the willingness to act on the part of the European 
Central Bank may be genuine. In a statement released by its President in 2009, the 
opportunity for an important institutional change was pointed out, along with the 
necessity to adapt the supervisory framework to the new financial landscape. Faced 
with the considerable increase in European financial integration observed in recent 
years: ‘The ECB/Eurosystem stands ready to accept any additional responsibilities 
that the member states may wish to assign to us in accordance with the Treaty’ 
(Trichet, 2009: 15) 
The operations of individual financial intermediaries, for example, are 
regulated at the domestic level, but operators at the same time enjoy a EU 
metaphorical passport of sort: once they are authorised in one member state, they are 
entitled to do business in others. Changing the rules in this respect amounts to 
interfering with both domestic and European legislation. A further problem arises 
from the fact that the euro area and the EU have different forms and intensity of 
membership, so that the interplay between monetary policy and financial regulation is 
complicated and ‘raises questions about which institution should take the lead at EU 
level’ (ibid: 1114). 
A further issue affecting European integration is that, as we have seen, 
ultimately taxpayers bear the risk of financial market failures. Because taxpayers are 
national, not European subjects, it is at the national level that austerity measures are 
designed as a result. Yet, financial operations involve a number of countries 
simultaneously, hence the unfair situation in which those nations burdened with cuts 
and penalties find themselves. For instance, the collapse of a British bank may lead to 
calls on taxpayers from other member states to foot the bill, but the negative reaction 
on the part of non-British nationals can be easily predicted. For this reason, 
authorities designing new regulations hesitate and fail to take action, thus 
exacerbating risk for future failings. 
    
The Volker rule 
 
In early 2009, President Obama appointed an Economic Recovery Advisory 
Board, chaired by Paul Volcker, a former Chairman of the Federal Reserve. The Board 
was tasked with making proposals for the reform of the financial sector. In the UK, 
the newly-formed coalition government, in June 2010, created an Independent 
Commission on Banking under the leadership of the eminent Oxford economist Sir 
John Vickers. The Volcker and the Vickers groups had slightly differing views, but 
ended up recommending similar policies, specifically the separation of banking 
activities into distinct sectors. A line was drawn between client-oriented and 
proprietary banking, retail and wholesale markets. The Volcker rule is understood as 
a ban on proprietary trading by commercial banks. Volcker argued that banks engaged 
in high-risk speculation were damaging the entire system and that the growing use of 
derivatives had to be halted. As of February 2013, the rule had not yet been 
implemented, and the US Congress discussed an amended, weaker version, therefore 
proposing the reduction rather than prohibition of hedge fund ownership by banks 
(Goldstein, 2014). It was found later that the Volcker rule, in the new version, was 
having little effect on their profits. European Union countries have also discussed the 
rule, reaching the conclusion that limitations rather than a total ban on hedge funds 
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dealing by banks are acceptable. In both Europe and the US, however, the very 
discussion of the Volcker rule has caused an exodus of traders from large banks to 
small hedge fund dealers, thus reproducing the grey financial area that contributed to 
the crisis in the first place.  
 In the UK, the distinction between investment banks and retail banks has not 
marked the decline of ‘packages’, ‘which are still available while regulators are 
impotent. They are underfunded and have little experience. At times they ignore what 
exactly they have to check or regulate. It is bankers themselves who advise clumsy 
regulators as to what they should look into.  
The Volcker rule may be ineffective in the Usa because of the proven symbiotic 
relationship between politicians and financiers (Prins, 2014). However, it is felt that 
banks in the Usa are more vulnerable to political backlash than in Britain: it is more 
likely for the ‘bad boys’ of Wall Street to be juxtaposed to the ‘decent boys’ of Main 
Street than for the City of London to be seen as ‘bad or indecent’. 
More radical proposals, transcending the potential impact of the Volcker rule, 
revolve around two opposite scenarios. The first would see the privatisation of risks, 
and consists of restructuring the banking system so that investors bear all potential 
costs, as well as all the profits (Dermine, 2013). The second would see a redesigning of 
the system so that all risks are socialised: in this way taxpayers enjoy the benefits but 
also cover the costs of possible bailouts. 
  
The haldane doctrine 
 
The Executive Director for Financial Stability at the Bank of England, Andrew 
Haldane, admitted that the financial crush made ‘the riches be privatised and the rags 
socialised’. But it was nobody’s fault: ‘For the most part the financial crisis was not the 
result of individual wickedness or folly. It was not a story of pantomime villains and 
village idiots. Instead, the crisis reflected a failure of the entire system of financial 
sector governance’ (Haldane, 2013: 21). Putting events in historical perspective, he 
also explained that in the first half of the 19th century the business of banking was 
simple: the owners-managers backed the bank’s losses with their own personal 
finances. Shareholder funds (so-called equity capital) protected clients from loss and 
bank directors excluded investors who were financially weak in facing risk. Things 
changed with the emergence of giants embracing the ‘too big to fail’ doctrine.  
 
‘At the start of the 20th century, the assets of the UK’s three largest banks accounted 
for less than 10 per cent of GDP. By 2007, that figure had risen above 200 per cent of 
GDP. When these institutions hit problems, a bad situation can become catastrophic. In 
this crisis, as in past ones, catastrophe insurance was supplied not by private creditors 
but by taxpayers. Only they had pockets deep enough to refloat banks with such huge 
assets. This story has been repeated for the better part of a century and a half; in 
evolutionary terms, we have had survival not of the fittest but the fattest. I call this 
phenomenon doom loop (ibid: 22). 
 
In Haldane’s view, ownership and control of banks have been left in the hands 
of a myriad of agents and brokers taking high risk and receiving large incentives. In 
this situation, while the losers are easy to identify, the beneficiaries should be found 
among small-term investors lured into quick-profit operations. His proposals for 
reform hinge on reshaping risk-taking incentives on a durable basis and increasing 
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the equity capital of banks. Such measures would increase the banks’ capacity to 
absorb loss and reduce the risk they can take. The proposals of the Basel Committee 
mentioned above constitute, in his opinion, a significant piece of reform in this respect. 
Bank governance and control, in Haldane’s argument, should be improved 
through increasing expertise and granting more power to risk committees. Voting 
rights within banks should be extended to wider groups of stakeholders, thus 
establishing genuine principles of democratic governance. Of course, pluralism in 
boards of governors comes at a cost: consensual decisions are slow to reach and action 
can become ineffective. But this is balanced by the benefits pluralism produces in 
avoiding catastrophic errors. 
In his evolutionary analysis, Haldane highlighted the increasing role played by 
‘economic formality’, with mathematics underpinning models, predictions and concepts 
being formalised to the point of shaping a theological doctrine. Businesses, in the past, 
would have on their boards experts in the area in which they operated. Now, he noted, 
all businesses, irrespective of the area, employ experts in economics and financial 
matters. On the contrary, it should be acknowledged that even experts have imperfect 
information and are surrounded by uncertainty, and economists in general should 
have a narrower view of themselves (Davies, 2012). Ultimately, a good leap forward 
was achieved in splitting up banks and diversifying their activities, with the 
distinction between retail and propriety institutions. As for the 2008 crisis, Haldane 
concluded, mistakes were made, although they were ‘honest’, not fraudulent mistakes, 
and anyone would have made them given how uncertain the world is.  
Critics of the Haldane doctrine note that the amount of public funds spent to 
rescue financial firms overweighs the annual expenditure for social security and 
education and is almost equal the expenditure for health (MacKenzie, 2013). The 
Basel Committee has never been effective in enforcing rules and has been too generous 
to banks in establishing the amount of liquidity these were prompted to possess 
(Pinto, 2014). Challenging Haldane’s view that individuals and boards of governors 
were not to be deemed responsible for the crisis: ‘The bonus culture requires radical 
change, much more than the response Haldane suggest. Senior bank executives and 
board members should be liable to charges of negligence and reckless lending in the 
event of bank failure and subject to suspension. Unless we get rid of the chancers and 
rogues, the most determined regulation will have no effect whatsoever’ (ibid: 231). 
On the other hand, little attention has been given to how ‘corporate 
personalities’ develop, collective intentions are shaped and practices applied. A deep 
analysis of such issues might definitively help apportioning blame and identifying 
preventative measures (Amatrudo, 2012). 
 
Business as usual? 
 
Authors remarking the lack of major prosecutions of companies or individuals 
after the crisis point out the influence of large financial institutions on law-making 
and regulation, as well as the high status of potential defendants (Pontell and Black , 
2014; Rakoff, 2014). Examinations of recent transnational responses highlight how the 
complexity of cross-border financial linkages makes rules difficult to implement. This 
is due, among other things, to the persistent tensions between transnational measures 
and national policies. The on-going power of private actors, moreover, is said to have 
made regulatory responses fall short of what would be needed (Porter, 2014). However, 
among the concerns of agencies and individual senior operators supporting new bank 
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regulations are ‘cyber risks’ which may have systemic implications, the survival of the 
‘too big to fail’ credo, the future low levels of interest rates caused by excessive 
regulation, and the growth of non-bank institutions taking on the role of financing the 
economy. On this last point, we have seen the fast move of intermediaries towards 
alternative financial firms as a response to the Volcker rule. On the prospect of 
declining rates of interests for investors, commentators fail to predict how this will 
encourage new forms of financial criminality as a way of making up for the interests 
lost. On ‘cyber risks’ we are uncertain whether this refers to new forms of criminality 
spreading in the domain of financial fraud. In brief, the concerns expressed encompass 
white collar as well as organised forms of conventional criminality that may be 
undeterred by the array of new regulations discussed and/or implemented. This 
section lists a series of recent episodes proving the apparent inefficacy of regulations. 
 
Zombie funds 
 
The City regulator called in lawyers to scrutinize the announcement of an 
investigation into 30 million pension and investment policies. The news sent shares in 
leading British insurers tumbling (Collinson and Osborne, 2014). The policies 
scrutinized were sold in the 1980s and 1990s and savers were trapped by penalty 
charges of 10%-12% and in some cases more than 20% if they wanted to move their 
money. The first two years of contribution by savers covered commissions earned by 
salespersons and annual charges were around 4% per year. These policies are still in 
use and the regulator assured financial firms that no compensation for customers 
would be imposed. Loss by savers is called “market value adjuster”. Customers, in 
brief, are trapped in funds where the annual bonuses have often fallen to zero and 
where they do not have access to their savings until retirement age. Regulators, on the 
other hand, cannot review the millions of policies individually; they cannot remove 
exit penalties without an ad hoc piece of legislation; they are impotent when it comes 
to introducing change in sales practices, and cannot apply current standard 
retrospectively, let alone calling for compensation of savers. 
This case prompts two observations. First, investigations such as this 
determine a plunge in share values, therefore they are feared by firms as well as 
customers, with the former pointing out the damaging effects that any attempt at 
regulation may produce. The status quo, in this view, is less harmful than any sort of 
external intervention. Second, disappointment and fear by savers may lead competing 
firms to offer their own services, persuading people to move money out of their pension 
to their own schemes. Such unsolicited offers of help may hide yet more speculative or 
even fraudulent purposes. 
 
Libor interest rates 
 
The ‘London interbank offered rate’ (Libor) was involved in criminal activity 
(illegally establishing currency exchange rates) affecting more than a dozen 
institutions on three continents. Investors were outraged when the scale of the offence 
was revealed, with Barclays Bank being asked to pay £290m in penalties for moving 
the exchange benchmarks and thus gaining illicit profits (Ruggiero, 2013). An enquiry 
led to three employees being charged by the Serious Fraud Office for conspiracy to fix 
Libor interest rates. According to the SFO the offences took place between August 
2006 and September 2010, therefore before but also well after the effects of the 2008 
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crisis came to light (Bowers, 2014). It is worth noting that Britain, through its own 
SFO only intervened when a similar initiative in the form of criminal investigation 
had been taken by its US counterpart, thus revealing a climate of competition among 
countries. Such competition, as this case shows, results in national regulators turning 
a blind eye to their compatriots’ financial criminality and adopting a harsh stance 
towards that of others. 
 
Co-op Bank 
 
This bank had a £1.5bn deficit in 2013 and was bailed out by hedge-fund 
investors and the wider Co-operative Group. In 2014, the Bank admitted that it 
needed a further £400m to balance its accounts (Armitage and Goodway, 2014). Mis-
selling of pension schemes and interest-rate-hedging products were certified, as well 
as breaches of the Consumer Credit Act. Shareholders, largely consisting of hedge 
funds and institutions, will be required to foot the bill.  
The Co-op Group was itself in turmoil after the resignation of its chief 
executive. The situation further alienated the ethical investors traditionally attracted 
to the Co-op Bank’s previous collective ownership structure. Some charities began 
looking for alternative places to bank after the hedge funds became the majority of 
shareholders. The Co-op Bank confirmed that it will cut 1,000 jobs from its 10,000-
strong workforce and close 30 of its branches.  
Cases such as this may become more frequent in the future due to the changing 
features and compositions of the National Audit Office. The NAO warned that a brain 
drain from Britain’s City watchdogs has led to their employing thousands of 
inexperienced staff. A report published by NAO expressed grave concerns that a third 
of staff at the Financial Conduct Authority have less than two years’ experience while 
a quarter of leavers from the Bank of England’s Prudential Regulation Authority are 
rated top performers. On the contrary, it would be vital for both watchdogs to attract 
and retain the right staff to cope with the challenges arising from the financial crisis. 
The report stressed the importance of effective oversight of an industry that is valued 
at more than £234bn. Regulated firms paid £664m in the 2013-2014 financial year to 
keep their regulators running, 24 per cent more than in the previous year. The 
increase is said to result from expensive and time-consuming investigations. 
Therefore, firms can claim that regulation is wasteful. Problems are compounded by 
the realisation by some regional directors of the astronomical level of remuneration 
enjoyed by top managers before and even after the crisis. But, as some commentators 
keep suggesting: ‘The rich deserve to be rich’ (Krugman, 2014). 
 
Lloyds banking group 
 
One of Britain’s biggest banks has cost victims of the payment protection 
insurance (PPI) scandal tens of millions of pounds by wrongly cutting their 
compensation awards. Lloyds Banking Group, which is 33 per cent owned by the 
taxpayer, has been cutting pay-outs to victims who were mis-sold the notorious 
insurance policies intended to cover loan payments if borrowers found themselves 
unable to work. Loans were mainly linked to property mortgages. In many cases, the 
fine print meant that customers could never make a claim. This is a case of a 
taxpayer-sponsored bank depriving taxpayers of their rightful compensation by using 
a loophole (Harper, 2014). 
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This case shows that the banking system itself is the root cause of severe 
instability. More than three quarters of bank loans are linked to property and this 
creates a self-fuelling boom-and-bust cycle. The availability of credit pushes up 
property prices and, as prices rise, they encourage a further round of speculative 
borrowing and buying – pushing prices up even more and well beyond what is 
sustainable in the long term. When the bust comes, the spiral goes into reverse and 
the deleveraging causes huge pain throughout the economy. The role of banks in 
economic textbooks is to provide capital to entrepreneurs to build businesses. That 
happens very little. We can suggest that today, the role of banks is to finance 
speculation in second-hand property.  
Equity returns, on the other hand, have declined since the 1990s, as money 
profits are appropriated by intermediaries. Fund managers do what is good for them 
and for the fund management business, and this is not always the same as what is 
good for the clients. Bending or mis-interpreting rules leads to momentum 
investments, which are not proven illicit as yet. But this reduces the business risk 
while the client suffers from poor performance. Fund managers try to compensate for 
poor returns by supporting greater incentives for management to perform – hence the 
explosion of executive pay and bonuses. But far from encouraging performance, 
bonuses are making management risk-averse and thereby condemning businesses to 
decline (managers would not give loans to entrepreneurs). Instead, managers will 
accumulate enough money to make their family secure for three generations. Short-
termism is the key. 
 
Channel islands 
 
The channel islands, particularly Jersey, Guernsey, Sark and the Isle of Man, 
continue to play their role. Described as ‘the worst tax dodgers’, they are inaccessible 
to foreign authorities engaged in investigations on tax evasion and financial fraud. In 
the Isle of Man there are thousands of completely unsupervised companies whose 
owners are hidden. In Guernsey and Sark it is common for local residents to act as 
bogus ‘nominee’ directors for tax-dodging companies. ‘The Channel Islands make so 
much money that islanders enjoy a standard of living twice higher that that on 
mainland Britain. A vast service industry has sprung up, involving lawyers, solicitors, 
accountants and banks’ (Christensen, 2011: 177). Money to the Channel Islands also 
arrives in the form of payments to supposed suppliers servicing entrepreneurs based 
on mainland UK or in other countries. In general, tax havens are regarded as 
prominent features of the globalised capital market and their very existence continues 
to create a ‘criminogenic environment in which illicit financial flows are easily 
disguised and hidden amongst legitimate commercial transactions’ (ibid). 
In the British territories there are still 3 million companies whose owners are 
unknown. It is also unknown who actually lies behind trusts and foundations, due to 
ownership secrecy remaining inviolable.  
 
Office of Tony Blair 
 
Evidence of how the borders between legitimate and illegitimate practices are 
uncertain was provided by controversial news relating to the companies owned by 
former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. Income channelled through a complex network 
of firms and partnerships controlled by Blair rose more than 40% in 2011 to more than 
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£12m. Of this, almost £10m was paid for ‘management services’. The money was 
transferred via a network of firms and financial vehicles. Accountancy experts 
questioned the arcane nature of the network’s finances, which makes it difficult to 
trace where its money is coming from or where it is being spent. Windrush Ventures is 
the name of the pool of companies linked to the ‘Office of Tony Blair’, but exactly what 
sort of ‘management services’ are provided, and how the companies generate their 
income, are impossible to determine. Blair has provided advice and consultancy to 
charitable foundations for poverty relief projects in Sierra Leone and Rwanda, 
creating his own Africa Governance Initiative.  He has also advised heads of states 
and global corporations, which led to criticism for the way his private and 
philanthropic activities tend to merge. He has lucrative consultancy contracts with 
luxury goods firms and insurance companies in Switzerland, has undertaken work for 
the royal family of Kuwait, an investment firm in Abu Dhabi and an oil company in 
South Korea. Blair is taking advantage of laws allowing him to limit what his 
companies and partnerships are required to disclose with the result that his accounts 
are far from transparent (Doward, 2012). 
 
Glencore International 
 
International aid is supposed to benefit small businesses and vulnerable 
peoples, like for example the aid provided through the World Food Programme, whose  
finances consist of donations and is aimed at feeding the starving and committed to 
buying food from very poor farmers. However, during the 2011-12 period, more than 
£500m ended up in the hands of a London-listed commodities trader, Glencore 
International. This conglomerate, which buys up supplies from farmers and sells them 
on at a profit, was in that period the biggest single supplier of wheat to the WFP. ‘In 
the latest half-year financial results, Glencore, which previously attracted controversy 
for environmental breaches and accusations of dealing with rogue states, reported that 
revenue from agricultural products doubled to $8.8m’ (Neate, 2012). Betting on rising 
wheat price, lobbying for bans on exportations from some countries, taking advantage 
from droughts and investing in agricultural ‘products futures’ allow giant food 
wholesalers to capitalise on ‘inert’ donation finances and turn them into profit. As a 
technique of rationalization, wholesalers might well mobilise the argument that they 
are less corrupt and more ethical than arms producers, because they at least provide 
food, not weapons. 
 
Flash brokers 
 
‘Flash brokers’ manage to beat regulators through high frequency trading, 
which is not just regarded as risky. ‘It is a form of legalised theft, designed to allow 
traders to skim profits from other investors’ (Surowiecki, 2014: 37). Put simply, an 
investor intending to buy shares, fractions of second before hitting the enter button, 
may find the price of those shares higher. Orders to buy, in other words, are captured 
by other traders who buy the wanted shares and resell them at higher prices (Lewis, 
2014). 
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Tesco 
 
Giant supermarket chain Tesco was involved in an accounting scandal, having 
released false data on profits in order to reassure share holders and attract new 
investors. Huge losses were suffered by pension funds, traders, small investors and 
staff holding shares. At the basis of the irregular accounts was the practice to demand 
financial contributions from suppliers and to record these payments in a creative 
fashion, thus pretending a healthy financial situation while sales declined. Companies 
such as Tesco are not required to disclose supplier contributions in their trading 
statements. About £700m were wiped off the stock market value of the company, and 
while share holders were defrauded, annual salaries amounting to around £1m were 
still given to senior managers after the investigation was launched (Wood, 2014). 
 
Barclays bank 
 
This large bank institution was accused by a campaign group of encouraging 
international fraudsters through its loose security procedures. The bank allowed 
individuals holding unchecked international passports to open accounts and set up 
fraudulent businesses. One example was a multi-million pound fraud against 
holidaymakers who booked villas and homes in exotic resorts and transferred money 
through the bank, only to find that those villas or homes did not exist or were not for 
rent. Campaigners posing as potential investors found that Barclays staff were 
extremely lax when examining applications, at times only requiring a foreign driving 
licence as ID. Fraudsters from around the world are attracted to the bank and, after 
opening their accounts, they can comfortably operate from anywhere they choose 
(Brignall, 2014). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA, 2014) has recently expressed 
its optimism, documenting improving market conditions, bolstered by a combination of 
macroeconomic prospects and liquidity support measures from central banks. Risks, 
we are told, are now below those observed in the more acute phases of the crisis. In 
this paper, by contrast, it has been argued that many of the measures proposed to 
prevent future crises have been contested, amended or scrapped. When applied, their 
potential effect has been neutralised through the creation or expansion of areas 
impervious to regulation. The suggestion that banks should hold significant quantities 
of cash or highly liquid securities in their portfolios has been countered with the 
argument that higher resources would expose banks to higher loss in case of further 
financial crises. Despite reforms introduced in the banking sector aimed at 
safeguarding customers and small businesses and the separation of retail and 
property banks (gov.uk, 2014), debts were and remain saleable commodities, and the 
‘maturity gap’ which contributed to the collapse is stationary or widening. The 
proposed limits for remuneration and bonuses for bankers and brokers has been met 
with the objection that such limits hamper competition and reduce the number of 
capable managers prepared to work in the financial sector. The appointment of 
growing numbers of regulators has been criticised for the lack of skills and 
professionalism the new appointees display. The notion that international financial 
markets need international regulatory tools was rejected because rules can only be 
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established nationally and can never be totally harmonised. Where new rules were 
implemented, financial markets witnessed an exodus of traders from large banks to 
small hedge fund dealers, namely to the grey areas that contributed to the 2008 
financial crisis. Finally, disappointment and fear on the part of savers is leading to 
emerging private firms to offer unsolicited help, often hiding yet more speculative or 
fraudulent purposes.  
The lack or ineffectiveness of new regulations may also be the result of the lack 
of substantial organized and ideological opposition to market philosophies, whereby 
policies continue to be tailored around the needs of bankers rather than citizens. Licit 
or illicit financial operations, both causing social harm, may be destined to continue 
undeterred as long as those conducting them can claim that such operations benefit 
not themselves, but society at large. Whistleblowers such as Hervè Falciani, the 
employee of a Swiss bank who passed clients’ details to tax investigators and 
personally to Christine Lagarde, head of the International Monetary Fund, are still in 
danger of prosecution (The Guardian, 8 May 2013). In the UK, large corporations 
continue to pay derisory amounts of tax despite their gigantic profits, tax incentives 
are still being offered to foreign companies with a view to attracting foreign 
investment, and this tax competition is triggering a race to the bottom which 
contributes to rendering the boundaries between white collar and organised crime 
increasingly blurred. Large companies, in brief, continue to be the biggest ‘welfare 
queens’, and tax breaks, grants, loans and subsidies constitute what can be termed 
‘corporate welfare’. Corporate theft and fraud continue undeterred, while pensions 
providers prove impervious to government threats (Tombs, 2013; Sikka, 2013). With 
risk operations still prevailing, and with the self-assurance of operators denying such 
risks, it is not just ‘waste’ being produced, but a dynamic leading to the infection of the 
whole financial system (Skidelsky and Skidelshy, 2012). 
There is no contemporary Solon in view, that is to say there is no novel 
democratic arrangement supervising the financial world and making sure its 
operation are fair. If regulations, as suggested at the beginning of this paper, have in 
the past mainly addressed organised crime while leaving white collar and corporate 
crime untouched, the growth of financial grey areas as described above may in fact 
offer organised criminals novel opportunities. The claim that markets are adaptive 
and self-regulating accompanies a perverse process whereby regulation pushes 
deregulation, thus expanding the areas in which all actors, legitimate or otherwise, 
will be regaled with unexpected chances to engage in crime. The following example is 
indicative of the bleak future ahead: HSBC, Britain’s biggest bank, agreed to pay a 
record £1.2bn to settle allegations that it allowed terrorist organisations and drugs 
traffickers to move billions of dollars around the financial system (Rushe and Treanor, 
2012).  
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